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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the determinants of legislative turnover in 8 west European lower chambers 
after 150 general elections in the period from 1945 to 2015. Legislative turnover is seen as the 
outcome of a representative elite production process that includes four elements: electorates, which 
shape the demand for MPs, selectorates, which shape the demand for candidates, electoral systems, 
which translate voter choice into seats as well as structure selectorate decisions, and finally the 
structure for political career opportunity, which shapes the supply of contenders. Within this 
framework, 9 hypotheses are formulated and analyzed using a hierarchical regression, controlling 
for idiosyncratic country effects. We find that electoral volatility, electoral system type, 
disproportionality and district magnitude, gender quotas, the duration of legislative term and 
regional authority have a substantive and statistically significant effect on turnover. Electorates 
and the structure of political career opportunity appear to matter more than electoral systems and 
selectorates when it comes to turnover.   
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 Introduction  
Since the benchmark study of Matland and Studlar (2004) on the determinants of legislative 
turnover across 25 advanced industrial democracies from 1974 to 1994, cross-national research on 
the topic has been extremely limited. As a result, the authors’ call ‘to take comparative legislative 
turnover seriously as a continuing, not a sporadic, topic in political science’ remains open (Matland 
and Studlar 2004, p. 104). In the present study we follow up on this suggestion. The research 
question we try to answer is what are the determinants of legislative turnover across country, across 
time? Our particular focus is on legislative turnover in west European democracies since the end 
of the Second World War. In view of this, we map the evolution of legislative turnover and explain 
the variability in the rate of membership change in the lower or unicameral legislative chambers 
of 8 west European democracies from 1945 to 2015: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and the UK.  
The theoretical starting point is that legislative turnover can be conceived as the outcome of a 
representative elite production process. This process takes place at the intersection of the supply 
of candidates, the demand of selectorates, the choices of electorates and the matching function of 
institutions (Best and Cotta 2000). We therefore examine the effects of four types of factors on 
legislative turnover: a) electorate party preferences, which reveal voter choices, b) the electoral 
system, which translates electorate party preferences into seats and/or creates incumbent 
deselection incentives, c) political party relevant factors, which shape the demand for candidates, 
and d) the structure for opportunity, which influences the supply of candidates. Among those 
factors we selected nine (9) theoretically relevant variables: electoral volatility, electoral system 
type, disproportionality, district magnitude, seats held by leftist parties in the lower chamber, 
gender quotas, duration of legislative term, MP remuneration and regional authority.    
We test our hypotheses using multiple regression, controlling also for idiosyncratic country effects. 
The paper is structured as follows. First we briefly discuss the importance of turnover as a topic, 
followed by a short overview of the literature and a brief discussion of the main findings in 
internationally comparative research on the topic. Second, we define and construct the dependent 
variable, as well as map the evolution of turnover comparatively across-country, across time. 
Third, we present our theoretical framework, formulate our hypotheses and construct our 
independent variables. Fourth, we describe our sample and analytical methods. In the fifth section 
we present and discuss the results of the analysis. We conclude by summarizing the main 
outcomes, pointing to limitations and offering leads for future research.     
The importance of turnover 
Legislative, parliamentary or simply turnover has been a long standing concern of political 
scientists, citizens, journalists and the international organization representing the world’s 
legislative assemblies, the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU 2012). Scholars and practitioners alike 
have raised a series of questions in relation to turnover.  
a) Is there an optimum, healthy benchmark of turnover? (normative) 
b) What is the development of turnover through time? (descriptive)  
c) What does turnover consist of? (descriptive with ambition to explanation) 
d) What explains legislative turnover? (explanatory)  
 The topic merits attention. To begin with, legislative personnel turnover is a ‘kind of 
seismographer’ detecting shifts in the foundations of politics and policy’ (Putnam 1976, p. 43). 
Studying circulation rates is the first logical step in mapping developmental patterns of the 
parliamentary elite since ‘the turnover rate sets the upper limit to social transformation in is widest 
sense’ (Pedersen 2000, p. 36). Second, legislative personnel turnover is a ‘democratic 
thermometer’ (Crowther and Manytone 2007). Perceived, among others, as the organization of 
alternation in power, democracy is said to suffer if it projects too much or too low turnover rates. 
Low turnover is associated with unresponsive legislative bodies and ‘Caesarism’ (Matland and 
Studlar 2004, Boll and Rommele 1994, Jackson J.S. 1994, Lawson 1993). High turnover rates 
harm the functioning of the parliament among others by breeding short-termism and instability 
(IPU, 2012, p. 16, 49). Policy innovation suffers too (Brunk & Mineheart 1984). On one hand, 
personnel changes, “even when party control of the legislature does not change, can lead to 
dramatic shifts in policy positions” (Matland and Studlar 2004, p. 88). On the other, increased 
turnover among legislators can make them short-sighted, affecting fiscal policy and economic 
growth (Uppal and Glazer 2014). Though there is surprisingly little agreement on what constitutes 
‘normal’ turnover the ‘usual’ turnover rate is estimated at anything between 20% to 40% (Best, 
Hausmann and Schmitt 2000, p. 184-185, Crowther and Matonyte 2007, p. 291, Kuklis 2013, p. 
30).   
Turnover: the literature 
For the study in hand we reviewed a broad body of literature on legislative turnover and elite 
circulation using a narrative review method starting from the seminal work of Charles S. Hyneman 
(1938) on tenure and turnover in US state level houses and senates. At a second stage we used 
systematic literature review methods to select papers that focus explicitly on the determinants of 
legislative turnover, either published or submitted in conferences in English from 1965 to 2015. 
At the time of drafting of this paper we have systematically reviewed 67 papers (out of 72 selected), 
36 of which are internationally peer reviewed articles. The majority of the published work (28) 
refers to the US context. This makes turnover a particularly American topic. Thus far we spotted 
only 8 internationally comparative studies. The majority of the selected papers refer to studies that 
are either single country (35), or comparative at the subnational level (23). It is evident from the 
above that internationally comparative research on legislative turnover has been minimal. In the 
remaining section we briefly present the main findings of this research.  
In his international comparison of the legislatures of Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Colombia and 
the US, Blondel (1973) provides evidence for Polsby’s (1968) thesis that institutional longevity of 
legislatures results in higher rates of legislative personnel stability. However, the work covers a 
set of broad topics beyond legislative turnover rates. In this respect, it would be fair to say that the 
first study that attempted to examine turnover cross-nationally in a systematic way is the multi-
author work edited by Somit, Wildenmann, Boll and Rommele (Somit et al 1994), which compares 
turnover in nine advanced industrial democracies. Given the different definitions on turnover and 
the dissimilar research designs, it is hard to draw any general conclusions from the nine different 
author analyses. Each national case appears as truly sui generis, although the usual suspects, 
namely electoral fluidity, political parties, electoral and political institutions figure as explanations 
in most chapters. In his comparison of turnover in two Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral 
systems, Gallagher (2003) finds that the fate of incumbents in Ireland (1927-1997) and Malta 
(1966-1998) is re-election. He shows that intraparty defeat is more common for large parties than 
for smaller ones and that inter-party defeat is higher in the multiparty system of Ireland in 
 comparison to the two party system of Malta. Karvonen (2004) is the first one to test a hypothesis 
on the effects of preferential voting on turnover, using a big dataset of 70 democracies. He finds 
no real association between preferential voting and turnover. In view of the varied approaches and 
indeterminate conclusions in earlier studies, Matland and Studlar (2004) provided the most 
systematic analysis to date, having employed a consistent cross-national comparison of turnover 
rates and their determinants across twenty five industrial democracies in the period 1974 to 1994. 
In what is a benchmark study for the field of turnover, Matland and Studlar (2004, p. 106) show 
that turnover in advanced industrial democracies is influenced by external factors, in particular 
voter volatility, while it is also “affected by a set of institutional variables stemming from the 
design of the electoral system”.  
Since the study of Matland and Studlar (2004) there has been very little internationally 
comparative work done on turnover. Dos Santos’ (2006) comparison of Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico is one of few exceptions. His counterintuitive finding is that the high rates of turnover 
are only marginally connected with electoral variations among the competing parties (Dos Santos 
2006). On the contrary, with the exception of Chile, party strategies for selecting and promoting 
candidates appear to be the most relevant variable explaining rates of parliamentary turnover. In 
his comparative study of turnover rates in the Baltics in the period 1990-2013, Kuklys (2013) finds 
that regime discontinuity, low levels of institutionalization of the legislatures and party system 
fractionalization is associated with high rates of turnover. A most recent attempt by Verzichelli 
(2014) to follow up on the Matland and Studlar (2004) comparative study is currently work under 
progress. The study focuses on the determinants of turnover in eleven European democracies in 
the high electoral volatility era of 1990-2012. It innovates theoretically by adding new variables 
for investigation like the effects of ‘leaderisation’, as well as the incentives of MPs to pursue a 
private career. Moreover, the study also introduces a qualitative investigation of the “critical 
elections that have determined, together with an evident reshaping of the party system, a significant 
turmoil in the structure of the parliamentary elite (Verzichelli 2014).  
Summing up the state of the internationally comparative literature on turnover it is evident that 
there remains a substantial open agenda for research across-countries, across time. In view of this, 
the work in hand aims to take a step in direction of addressing this empirical gap.  
Theory, hypotheses and variable construction  
The dependent variable: legislative turnover 
In the present paper we define legislative turnover as the rate of ‘political alternation’ after general 
elections. First of all, it is electoral turnover we are interested in, not mid-term turnover which 
takes place in between elections. Second, as François & Grossman (2015) pointed, by addressing 
political alternation we focus both on first entry and returning representatives. Our focus is on both 
legislative elite renewal and representative elite re-circulation. Legislative turnover is 
operationalized as the proportion of both first entry and returning members of parliament (MPs), 
henceforth newcomers, out of the total membership in a legislative assemblyiii.  
We collected data on first-entry and returning representatives in eight west European lower and 
unicameral chambers. We began the count from the second general election after the Second World 
War, using the first post war legislative assembly, usually of a constitutional nature, as a point of 
reference. We finished with the most recent general election, the cut-off year being 2015. Our 
sources comprise both digitalized parliamentary databases, as well as archival material on MP 
 political mandates like biographical registries, legislature composition documents and assembly 
yearbooksiv. Where possible, we compared our newcomer data with available MP political 
mandate and career datasets in order to observe the presence or not of significant differencesv. 
Some differences were detected, the majority of which are differences of degree, not of kind.  
Explanations 
  
Legislative turnover is conceptualized as the outcome of a representative elite production process. 
As Best and Cotta (2000) argued, this process takes place at “the intersecting point between the 
supply of candidates, the demand of selectorates and the choice of the voters” (Best and Cotta 
2000, p. 9). Candidates are those individuals who enter the competition for office. Selectorates are 
collective actors, in the case of Europe political parties, who select candidates according to internal 
procedures and criteria. Electorates are the end consumers and judges of the outcomes of the 
legislative recruitment function of parties. The matching of candidate supply with selectorate and 
electorate demand is influenced by broader systemic and politico-institutional factors. Best and 
Cotta (2000, p. 10-11) refer to those factors as the formal structure of opportunity. In the present 
paper we examine the effects of four types of such systemic and politico-institutional factors on 
legislative turnover: a) aggregate electorate party preferences, b) electoral system factors which 
constrain and translate electorate preferences into seats, as well as create incentives for deselection 
of incumbents, c) political party system factors, which shape the demand for candidates, and d) 
the structure for opportunities, which influences the supply of candidates.     
Electorates  
The choices that voters make at the ballot constitute one of the most common sources of political 
alternation in parliaments. Voters are called to choose political party and/or individual candidates. 
Past empirical research reveals that voter candidate choices, exercised via preferential voting, do 
not decisively affect legislative turnover rates (Karvonen 2004, Matland and Studlar 2004). It is 
voter swings leading to changes in party vote-shares at the aggregate level that matter most when 
it comes to turnover.vi In view of this   
H1:The higher the level of electoral volatility, the higher the rate of legislative turnover.  
Known also as “electoral fluidity”, aggregate volatility, the “Pedersen Index”, or Total Net Change 
(TNC), electoral volatility measures changes in party vote-shares at the aggregate level (Pedersen 
1979, 1980, 1983). It consequently captures voter party preference swings. We use it here to 
measure the role of “the end consumer” in the “electoral support market”, and in particular the 
parliamentary recruitment process (Best and Cotta 2000, p. 12). The changing electorate will 
arguably affect turnover rates in two different ways. There is first of all a self-evident mechanical 
effect. If volatility is high, there will be more shifts of seats between parties, and turnover will 
automatically increase. Newcomers will be expected to come in as a result of incumbents’ electoral 
defeat. But there is also a psychological effect: in a highly volatile electoral context, the job of 
MPs will become more precarious. However strong the position of the MP within the party, if the 
electoral tide changes, he or she risks to get thrown out. In such a precarious situation, MPs will 
be more inclined to grasp any opportunity of a more secure job. In sum, we expect to find a strong 
positive effect of electoral volatility on legislative turnover. In the present paper we measure 
aggregate electoral volatility using the Pedersen Index (V) as the index was calculated by Ersson 
(2012) for 31 European countries in the period 1945-2012vii. For elections after 2012 we calculate 
electoral volatility using Ersson’ (2012) formula and rules.   
 Electoral systems 
The type of electoral system may be responsible for a relatively high or low rate of turnover among 
MPs (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, p. 21). However, the way electoral systems matter is contested. 
Various plausible hypotheses in either direction can be formulated (Gallagher 2000, p.84). We 
discern two levels of electoral system effects on legislative turnover. First, electoral systems 
arguably matter by influencing candidate (de)selection incentives for party selectorates. This 
influences intra-party incumbency turnover, which automatically affects legislative turnover. 
Second, electoral systems matter because of what they have been designed to do in the first place. 
To match the supply of candidates and voter preferences, as well as delimit the number of 
representatives per constituency. We are going to test three hypotheses of electoral system effects 
on turnover at both levels. 
H2: PR electoral systems lead to higher levels of turnover 
Different families of electoral systems create different candidate deselection incentives for party 
selectorates (Matland and Studlar 2004, Manow 2007, Verzichelli 2014). Irrespective of ballot 
type (closed list, flexible list, open list, ordinal), the argument goes, systems within the PR-list 
family assign a greater role to parties than to individual candidates (Matland and Studlar 2004). 
On the one hand party selectorates control access to fixed or ranked ballots, on the other candidates 
who compete for office rely less on cultivating a personal vote. This in effect increases the 
incentives of party selectorates to deselect or re-rank incumbents. Deselection or re-ranking 
increases intra-party candidate turnover, which results into higher turnover rates (Put, Gouglas, 
Maddens 2015). While it is not clear why this should be the case in open list ballots, where the 
candidates’ rank is indicative, empirical researchers have indeed found a substantive and 
statistically significant association between systems belonging in the PR-list family and legislative 
turnover (Matland and Studlar 2004, Verzichelli 2014). We test this hypothesis as it stands in the 
literature. We coded electoral systems as a 0,1 dummy variable. Countries receive 1 if, at the time 
of the general election, their electoral system belonged to the PR-list family (irrespective of ballot 
type). They receive a 0 if they were not (majoritarian and majoritarian in the first tier). Information 
on electoral system families was collected from the Database of Electoral systems (Pilet, Renwick, 
Núñez, Reimink, Simón 2016). 
H3: The higher the level of electoral system disproportionality the lower the rate of turnover 
Electoral systems also matter in respect to certain fundamental functions they have been designed 
to perform. One of the most important such functions is to match the supply of candidates with the 
demand of electorates by translating votes into seats. Whether electoral systems do this in a 
proportional or disproportional way influences turnover. Disproportionality refers to the deviation 
of parties’ seat shares from their vote shares, while perfect proportionality is the situation in which 
every party receives exactly the same share of seats with its share of votes. While 
disproportionality is a much studied conventional dimension of electoral systems, in terms of its 
relationship to legislative turnover, it is largely ignored. However, there is a strong theoretical case 
to be made. In a system of perfect proportionality any change in party vote-shares is expected to 
automatically translate into legislative turnover. As disproportionality increases not all swings in 
party vote-shares translate into seats in parliament. A big chunk of the vote, usually belonging to 
smaller yet sizeable parties, is not translated into seats in the legislature. This has traditionally been 
the case with the Liberal party in the UK and in the May 2015 general election also with UKIP.  
 As with electoral volatility there are numerous measures of disproportionalityviii. We measure 
disproportionality using the Gallagher’s Least Square index (Gallagher 2015).  
H4: The higher the mean district magnitude at the first tier the higher the legislative turnover 
District magnitude refers to the number of seats and consequently the number of MPs sent to 
parliament per electoral constituency. Past empirical research reveals that multi-member districts 
(MMDs) increase the influx of newcomers and facilitate incumbent exit (Niemi and Winsky 1987, 
Crain 1977, Reed 1994, Sobel 1998, Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2004). Matland and Studlar 
(1995) argue that this happens rather mechanically because small changes in party vote shares in 
MMDs lead to greater seat shares in parliament. Others have argued that gaining visibility is more 
difficult for candidates in multimember districts, resulting in more frequent primary and general 
election defeats (Cox and Morgenster 1995, Jewell 1982). However, Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 
(2004, p. 372) argue that ‘it has more to do with candidate choices than with voter behaviour. 
Perhaps being one member of a multimember delegation is less satisfying than being the sole 
representative of a constituency, thus leading more legislators not to run for re-election’. Niemi 
and Winsky (1987) suggest too, suggest two incumbent related reasons. First, turnover in MMDs 
increases because of higher incumbent resignation rates due to higher costs associated with 
electoral campaigns in multi-member districts. Second, in MMD’s it is more difficult to establish 
meaningful, stable, and broad constituency relationships. In order to test the hypothesis we 
collected data on the average district magnitude before elections at the first tier. For this we used 
information from the Database of Electoral Systems (Pilet, Renwick, Núñez, Simón 2016).   
Political Parties 
Candidate selection is the core activity that distinguishes political parties from any other type of 
political organization (Sartori 1976). By regulating the supply of candidates, party selectorates 
influence the rate of political alternation in parliaments. High levels of candidate rotation, 
especially when this includes incumbents, increases turnover. We test two hypotheses.  
H5: The more seats leftist parties control in parliament, the higher the rate of legislative turnover  
One of the reasons why a party might rotate candidates is party ideology. Although this hypothesis 
was disconfirmed in the Matland and Studlar (2004) study there are still strong theoretical grounds 
for retesting it. The literature reveals that Leftist parties are cautious of growing distant from the 
electorate, thus developing various mechanisms of renewing their candidates via the imposition of 
quotas or even the outright imposition of term limits. In 1968, for instance, the Social Democratic 
Party of Austria introduced an upper age limit of 65 years old for parliamentary candidates. This 
resulted to the resignation, among others, of the then parliamentary party chairman, who ended his 
parliamentary career (Jenny 2014, 9). Yet also Green parties and Liberal parties are widely known 
to opt for such candidate and MP renewal practices. In view of this, following Matland and Studlar 
(2004) we hypothesize that leftist political party ideology increases legislative turnover. We 
measure this as the percentage of seats held by legislators of leftist parties. We calculate this using 
data on party seats and the political parties’ Left-Right continuum in the ParlGov dataset developed 
by Döring, Holger and Manow (2015). Parties that score below 5 in the L-R 10 point scale are 
counted as leftist parties.    
H6: Gender quotas increase legislative turnover .  
 Gender quotas have become a part of the electoral landscape around the world, especially since 
the mid-1970s. The most common type of gender quota is the voluntary party quota (PVQ), though 
there has also been an increase in legislated compulsory party quota, as well as legally or even 
constitutionally reserved seats for women and women’s only lists. Past research reveals that gender 
quotas are a consistently predominant factor explaining the increase in female representation 
(Tripp and Kang 2008, p. 358). If gender quotas are sufficiently strict, they increase the number of 
women MPs. Gender quota regulation is therefore expected to increase legislative turnover 
temporarily, at the moment of their introduction. However, we would expect them to increase 
turnover also in the longer run. First, by increasing women’s motivation to stand for election. 
Second via a critical mass effect, as gender quotas are adopted and implemented by more actors 
and male candidates are continuously replaced by female ones. Following Tripp and Kang (2008), 
we coded gender quotas as a 0,1 dummy variable. Cases receive a value of 1 if the biggest party 
in parliament has established party voluntary quotas (PVQs) or if the country as a whole has 
legislated compulsory party quota, reserved lists or women-only lists. They receive a value of 0 if 
they do not have such quotas. Data on quotas was collected using the Global Quota Project 
database (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015) and the associated 
atlas for electoral gender quotas (Dahlerup, Hilal, Kalandadze, Kandawasvika-Nhundu 2013).    
The structure for political career opportunities  
Whatever  motivates professional politicians, ambition, power, social status, ‘good’ policy or the 
‘common good’, it has been argued that “they all share three common interests that are a direct 
corollary of their pursuing a professional political career”: income, career maintenance or 
continuity and career advancement (Borchert 2011, p. 119). In view of this, we expect the systemic 
and institutional setting that structures individual ambition to influence turnover. We test three 
hypotheses.   
H7: The greater the duration of a legislative term before general elections, the higher the rate of 
legislative turnover  
The odds that an MP will search for a new challenge and make a career move can be expected to 
increase with the duration of the legislative term. The maximum duration is always fixed, but may 
be shortened due to early dissolution. The longer the term lasts, the more an MP will be inclined 
to resign prematurely if a career opportunity pops up (Melchert, 2011). Moreover, a longer normal 
term may also act as a disincentive for the MP to run again in the election due to potential coming 
electoral defeat from changes occurring in the electorate. Therefore, we expect that a longer 
legislative term will coincide with more legislative turnover as there is greater possibility of 
incumbent strategic retirement. We measure the duration of a legislative term as the number of 
days between two general elections. 
H8: The higher the salaries of MPs, the lower the rate of legislative turnover  
Speculating about the causes of high turnover in US state legislatures in the period 1925-1935, 
Hyneman (1938, p.30) argued that one of the main reasons behind it is a financial one. Members 
receive a very meagre pay and staying in office for one to two terms is more than enough for them 
to be giving ‘money out of the pocket to serve in the legislature’. The ‘salary feature’, as Hyneman 
(1938) coined it in his seminal study, constitutes a main hypothesis in the turnover literature. The 
higher the wages the more attractive the parliamentary mandate, and the more a member of 
parliament will be inclined to keep it. In their theoretical model of political career decisions, 
 Matozzi and Merlo (2008) find that an increase in the salary of a politician while in office decreases 
turnover. A higher salary in the political sector makes politics a more attractive option for 
incumbent politicians who are more willing to stay in politics than jump to the relatively worse 
market wages. From an empirical point of view there is ample evidence for both the rejection 
(Oxendale 1979, Greene 1993, Blair and Henry (1981), as well as the confirmation of the salary 
hypothesis (Ray 1974, Rosenthal 1974, Squire 1988, Sobel 1998, Kieweit and Zeg 1993, 
Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 2005, Keane and Merlo 2007, Mattozzi and Merlo 2008)ix. For the 
testing of this hypothesis, we collected data on MP annual remuneration from the archives of each 
legislative chamber. In order for MP salaries to be meaningful and comparable across-country, 
across-time we transformed them into a ratio compared to the Gross National Income per head, 
using data from the AMECO dataset (AMECO 2016). The ratio captures increases or decreases in 
MP wages relative to the average annual national wage. As the distance between MP salaries and 
the average national income (ratio) increases, turnover is expected to decrease.      
H9: The higher the regional authority index, the higher the rate of legislative turnover 
It has been argued that the emergence of strong regions has important consequences for the career 
planning of politicians and political parties (Vanlangenakker, Maddens and Gert-Jan-Put 2013, p. 
357). To the extent that regions gain authority, and regional legislative assemblies become 
powerful, politicians are faced with the choice of having to select between the national and the 
regional levels (Vanlangenakker 2013, p. 357). Political careers are not necessarily unidirectional. 
Previous research on career patterns has shown that the traditional spring board model (which 
assumes that politicians always move to a higher political level) often does not apply in multi-level 
systems (Stolz, 2010; Vanlangenakker, Maddens & Put, 2013). Borchert (2011, p. 130-132) argues 
that careers can also happen in alternative patterns or in integrated career circuits. Fiers (2001) 
argued that in multi-level polities like the Belgian one we observe the phenomenon of “level-
hopping”. The structure of the political market provides a variety of opportunities the sheer number 
of which encourages movement without clear top and bottom career paths (Fiers 2001, Borchert 
2011, p. 131). In such a wide ranging market place of political job opportunities, options that are 
not being perceived as degradation are in plenty. More in particular, we can expect that regions 
with high authority, among others enjoying strong regional parliaments with legislative powers 
will - under certain conditions – exert a force of attraction on politicians in national parliaments, 
thereby increasing turnover.  
The literature suggests various ways of measuring regional authorityx. Despite the merits of such 
approaches we opt for the Regional Authority Index (RAI), developed by Hooghe, Marks, Schakel, 
Chapman, Niedzwiecki and Shair-Rosenfield (Hooghe et al 2014). RAI, which is an aggregate 
measure based on regional tier scores, measures the scope, depth and spheres of action of regional 
authority. It focuses on self-rule and shared rule along ten dimensions: institutional depth, policy 
scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, representation, law making, executive control, fiscal 
control, borrowing control and constitutional reform. More importantly it has been calculated for 
the period 1950-2008. 
Methods 
Table 4 summarizes the dependent variable and its operationalization, as well as the independent 
variables and their predicted effects.  
 Table 1: Hypotheses and operationalization 
Variable Hypothesis Expected 
Relationship 
Operationalisation 
Dependent Variable    
Legislative  Turnover 
(Political Alternation) 
  (N. of first entry and returning 
MPs / Number of parliamentary 
seats) * 100 
DVs Aggregate 
Electorate Party 
Preferences 
   
Electoral Volatility As electoral volatility increases 
turnover increases 
+ (one-tailed) Pedersen Index 
DVs Electoral System    
Electoral system type PR systems project higher 
turnover 
+ (one tailed) Dummy variable: 0=non-PR, 
1=PR 
Electoral system 
disproportionality 
As disproportionality increases 
turnover increases  
- (one-tailed) Gallagher’s Disproportionality 
Index  
District Magnitude As DM increases turnover 
increases 
+ (one tailed) Average DM size  
DVs Political Parties    
Party Ideology As % of leftist parties in 
parliament increases turnover 
increases  
+ (one tailed) % of seats held by leftist parties. 
Left = <5 in the 0-10 L-R 
continuum in ParlGov 
Gender Quotas The presence of gender quotas 
increase regular turnover 
+ (one tailed) Dummy variable 0=no gender 
quotas, 1= gender quotas 
DVs The Structure of 
Opportunity 
   
Duration of legislative 
term 
The longer the duration of the 
legislative term the higher the 
regular turnover 
+ (one tailed) 
 
 
Number of days between 
elections 
MP Remuneration  As the ratio of MP remuneration 
to GNI per head increases 
turnover decreases 
-(one tailed) Ratio of annual MP 
remuneration (current prices) to 
GNI per head (current prices) 
Regional Authority The higher the authority of 
regions the higher the regular 
turnover 
+ (one tailed) 
 
 
Regional Authority Index  
 
 
Cases  
The population under investigation consists of democratically elected lower chambers in Europe 
since WWII. There are 15 European democracies with uninterrupted democratic life in the period 
1945-2015: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK,. South European democracies, such as 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, which experienced long streaks of non-democratic rule, are beyond 
the scope of the present study. As are also Central and Eastern European ones, which have been 
late to democratize.  
 On pragmatic grounds, a trade-off had to be made between maximizing the number of countries 
and being able to extend the investigated period so far back in time. In view of this, we selected 
the lower chambers or the unicameral assembly in eight west European democracies: Austria, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the UK. We know from past 
research that the above selected countries project significant variation in relation to legislative 
turnover rates. They also project considerable variation in respect to the independent variables 
under consideration across time and across country.  
The units of observation are 150 legislative sessions after general elections from 1945 to 2015 in 
eight legislative chambers. For the analysis, though, in order to avoid outliers, we reduced the 
sample down to 141 cases using both theoretical and statistical criteriaxi.  
Analytical method 
Our data consists of a continuous dependent variable and both categorical and continuous 
independent variables (9), at the level of both the unit of analysis (individual sessions after 
elections) and the higher level of each of the eight democracies (countries).  Even though there is 
a hierarchical structure in the data, meaning that we would greatly benefit from the process of 
‘partial pooling’ for estimating country effects, we do not at this stage opt for the use of multi-
level analysis (MLA). The reason for this is that estimates obtained using a small number of higher 
level cases (<10) can reach high levels of bias using both ML and, though lesser so, Bayesian 
estimators (Stegmueller 2013).xii  
In view of this we opted for a multivariate analysis using multiple regression. In the initial 
regression we test idiosyncratic country effects, using country dummies, the baseline category 
being the Netherlands. Three of the country dummies project significant effects. The UK is highly 
significant (p<.01), while Italy and France are marginally significant  at the p<.1. As the possibility 
of non-accounted for idiosyncratic country effects is high, we decided to include those three 
country dummies in our full model, dropping the rest in order to increase our degrees of freedom.  
We ran a hierarchical regression, where every block in the hierarchy represents a theoretically 
important element in the process of representative elite production. The first block (model 1) 
comprises aggregate electorate party preferences, the second electoral system factors (model 2), 
the third political party related factors (model 3), the fourth the structure of opportunities (model 
4), and the fifth (model 5) controls for the effects of the three country outliers, UK, Italy and 
France.  
 
Comparing legislative turnover rates  
Table 1 presents basic descriptive statistics on legislative turnover rates for the period 1945-2015.   
Table 2: Legislative turnover in Western Europe 1945-2015. N=150 
Country N Legislative 
Turnover 
(mean) (%) 
Legislative 
turnover 
(minimum) 
(%) 
Legislative 
turnover 
(maximum) 
(%) 
Legislative 
turnover  
(StdDev.) 
UK 18 20,67 7,87 39,61 8,38 
 Sweden  21 32,82 20,86 46,29 8,03 
Austria 20 33,01 18,18 48,09 9,28 
Belgium 21 33,91 10,38 60 13,03 
Switzerlandxiii 17 36,95 29,5 44 4,48 
Netherlands 20 37,62 18 52,67 10,69 
France xiv 17 42,03 18 77,84 12,34 
Italyxv 16 45,54 30,16 69,5 10,5 
Grand Total 150xvi 35,05 7,87 77,84 11,82 
 
On average the rate of political alternation in the legislative assemblies under investigation is 
35,05%. It ranges from a minimum of 7,9% after the second 1974 UK snap general election, to a 
maximum of 77,8% after the 1958 French general election, the first of the fifth republic. A first 
interesting observation in table 1 is the presence of certain discrepancies between the comparative 
benchmark study by Matland and Studlar (2004) and the data in hand. A first such discrepancy is 
that Austria, previously ranked in the group of relatively higher legislative turnover democracies 
is now tilting towards the lower end. This is in accordance with the findings of Jenny (2014). 
Another discrepancy is that Italy,  which was previously positioned next to the median country, 
Finland, and ranked as an average to high turnover democracy, now overtakes France. Italy 
projects the highest average legislative turnover rate among the democracies in our sample. France 
is still ranked as a high legislative turnover democracy. The discrepancies are explained by the 
longer time span of the data in hand (1945-2015) in comparison to the study of Matland and Studlar 
(20004).  
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the average legislative turnover rate for all chambers in the 
period from 1945 to 2015. An interesting observation is that since the end of the 1980s legislative 
turnover, seen as a ‘democratic thermometer’, measures some significantly higher temperatures in 
comparison to the period before. Similarly, seen a ‘seismographer’, legislative turnover detects 
important disturbances in the underlying patterns of power. Those disturbances are located 
consistently above the ‘layer’ of the historical turnover rate at 35,05%. 
 Figure 1: Evolution of mean legislative turnover rate in Western Europe 1945-2015. Historical outlook N=150 
 
 
 
Best (2006) suggested that the early nineties is a breaking point for patterns of legislative 
recruitment, production and reproduction of Western representative elites due to the end of the 
long post war period of the ‘consensus challenge’ and the emergence of the ‘legitimacy challenge’. 
Table 3 presents a comparison of the average turnover rates of the eight investigated democracies 
before and after 1989. France projects, the lowest increase (6,6%), while in Belgium average 
turnover rates increase by 85%. With the exception of the UK and Austria, the rest of the 
investigated democracies project legislative turnover rates marginally above (Sweden and 
Switzerland) or well above (Italy and Belgium) the ‘normal’ turnover limit of 40%. France has 
always been above the 40% ‘normality’.  
 
 Table 3: Legislative turnover averages per country and historical period (Historical outlook N=150) 
Country Legislative Turnover 
1945-1989  (mean %)  
Legislative turnover 
1989- 2015 (mean %) 
Increase in average 
turnover rate since 
1989  
UK 17,77 26,45 48,85 
Sweden  28,94 40,56 40,15 
Austria 28,56 39,68 38,94 
Belgium 26,41 48,9 85,16 
Switzerland 34,87 40,75 16,86 
Netherlands 34,41 42,41 23,25 
France 40,23 42,91   6,66 
Italy 38,54 54,16 40,53 
Grand Total 31,22 41,98 34,47 
 
 
Regression results and discussion 
Table 5 reports the results of the hierarchical regression in relation to the testing of our 9 
hypotheses, as formulated and introduced in the initial full model.  
 
Table 4:   Determinants of Legislative Turnover in 141 Elections in 8 West European 
Democracies from 1945 to 2015. Full model 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 23,668 1,617  14,640 ,000 
Electoral Volatility V 1,127 ,141 ,631 7,979 ,000 
2 (Constant) 18,828 4,762  3,953 ,000 
Electoral Volatility V 1,203 ,154 ,674 7,791 ,000 
Deselection (PR) 5,648 4,093 ,220 1,380 ,171 
Disproportionality (Gh-Lsq) ,008 ,327 ,004 ,024 ,981 
Mean District Magnitude (first tier) -,018 ,017 -,094 -1,033 ,304 
3 (Constant) 15,723 7,592  2,071 ,041 
Electoral Volatility V 1,286 ,178 ,721 7,241 ,000 
Deselection (PR) 6,560 4,244 ,255 1,546 ,126 
Disproportionality (Gh-Lsq) ,070 ,337 ,036 ,209 ,835 
Mean District Magnitude (first tier) -,017 ,018 -,091 -,982 ,329 
Seats by Leftist Parties ,039 ,096 ,035 ,411 ,682 
 Gender Quotas -1,803 1,899 -,086 -,950 ,345 
4 (Constant) -7,570 7,581  -,999 ,321 
Electoral Volatility V ,994 ,155 ,557 6,434 ,000 
Deselection (PR) ,681 3,730 ,027 ,183 ,856 
Disproportionality (Gh-Lsq) -,288 ,284 -,147 -1,014 ,313 
Mean District Magnitude (first tier) ,011 ,015 ,056 ,685 ,495 
Seats by Leftist Parties ,115 ,087 ,102 1,325 ,189 
Gender Quotas 1,338 1,620 ,064 ,826 ,411 
Duration of electoral term ,012 ,002 ,406 5,766 ,000 
Ratio of MP Remuneration to GNI per 
head 
,878 ,405 ,150 2,170 ,033 
Regional Authority Index ,554 ,156 ,282 3,542 ,001 
5 (Constant) 11,418 6,061  1,884 ,063 
H1: Electoral Volatility V **,582 ,123 ,326 4,746 ,000 
H2: Deselection (PR) **-9,440 3,349 -,368 -2,819 ,006 
H3:Disproportionality (Gh-Lsq) *-,484 ,236 -,247 -2,054 ,043 
H4: Mean District Magnitude (first tier) *,028 ,011 ,147 2,431 ,017 
H5: Seats by Leftist Parties ,060 ,065 ,053 ,916 ,362 
H6: Gender Quotas **2,980 1,217 ,142 2,448 ,016 
H7: Duration of electoral term *,013 ,002 ,429 8,222 ,000 
H8: Ratio of MP Remuneration to GNI 
per head 
-,462 ,369 -,079 -1,253 ,213 
H9: Regional Authority Index **,507 ,120 ,258 4,238 ,000 
        UK **-14,178 3,792 -,432 -3,739 ,000 
        Italy **8,885 2,011 ,293 4,417 ,000 
       France 4,331 3,659 ,112 1,184 ,240 
 
Note. Dependent Variable: Legislative Turnover (% political alternation; adjusted R-square=.788, s.e.= 4,59747, sample size=141 
*Significant at 0.05 level, **Significant at 0.01 level 
 
As expected, legislative turnover is shown to be significantly higher at higher levels of electoral 
volatility (H1). Holding all other explanatory factors constant, one unit of change in the V index 
increases legislative turnover by half a percentage point (B=0,582). The effect is substantive 
(Beta=0,326) and statistically highly significant (p< 0.01). The fact that voter swings increase 
turnover does not come as a surprise.  
Our second hypothesis is that electoral systems in the PR-list family, irrespective of ballot type 
(closed, flexible, panachage, open), produce greater incentives for incumbent deselection and that 
 for this reason they are expected to project higher levels of legislative turnover (H2). The 
regression results show that the reverse is true. When all other factors are held constant, electoral 
systems coded as list-PR decrease legislative turnover by 9,4 percentage points. The effect is 
substantive (Beta= -0,368) and highly significant (p<0.01). The result seems illogical. We explored 
the data in hand descriptively in order to better understand why this may be so. With the exception 
of the UK, which is a majoritarian electoral system (coded non-PR) and projects systematically 
low levels of turnover, the other non-PR cases, the French fifth republic (majoritarian) and the 
Italian second republic (majoritarian at the first tier till 2006) project extremely high turnover rates. 
Moreover, within country variations reveal that turnover in the majoritarian French fifth republic 
(1958-2015) is higher than in the PR-list fourth republic (1946-1956). Similarly in Italy, turnover 
rates are higher during the majoritarian (at the first tier) era of 1994-2006 than in the first republic 
(1948-1992).  
Given that past empirical research claims a substantive significant positive effect of PR-list 
systems on turnover, the finding raises many questions about operationalization and theory. First, 
the operationalization of the variable is questionable. Do all PR-list systems create the same 
incumbent deselection incentives? Why should it be the case that in an open list (Italian first 
republic) or panachage (Switzerland) type of ballot, party selectorates find it easier to deselect 
incumbents? After all, in such systems the vote is more directly connected to individual candidates 
than in closed list or even flexible list ones. As the study in hand is work in progress a first 
suggestion is to recode and retest the hypothesisxvii. A second possibility is that the effect captured 
in the data is highly influenced by idiosyncratic country effects. As a matter of fact the change of 
sign in the direction of the relationship as we introduce the country dummies is a strong indication 
that this could be the case. Third, beyond methods, it may be also the case that electoral systems 
do not impact selectoral decisions on incumbent deselection. As a matter of fact we do know from 
recent empirical research that electoral systems do not affect selectoral practices (Shomer 2014). 
In view of this, an alternative would be to stop using electoral systems as proxies for selectoral 
practices all together and either find a better way to operationalize direct party effects at the 
aggregate level, or move the research to the party level of analysis. The latter seems more 
promising.  
This brings us to our third hypothesis according to which turnover decreases as electoral system 
disproportionality increases (H3). The regression results confirm this hypothesis. Holding all other 
factors constant a unit increase in disproportionality decreases turnover by -0,484 percentage 
points, having a substantive effect to the outcome (Beta= -0,247). This is a significant finding 
(p<.05 level) concerning the relationship between the way electoral systems translate votes into 
seats and turnover. In respect to multimember constituencies, we hypothesized that legislative 
turnover increases as district magnitude increases (H4). The hypothesis is also confirmed. An 
increase of average district magnitude by one results to an increase of 0,28 percentage points in 
legislative turnover. The effect is almost highly significant (sig. 0.017) and substantive (Beta = 
0,147), though less than the two previous predictors.  
As was the case in the Matland and Studlar (2004) study, political ideology does not seem to matter 
when it comes to turnover. The share of seats leftist parties hold in parliament has a very small, 
non-substantive and  statistically insignificant effect on turnover. On the contrary, a significant 
finding concerns gender quotas (H6). As parties introduce voluntary quotas or states legislative 
compulsory quotas political alternation in parliament increases. The increase is substantive. The 
 introduction of gender quotas increases turnover by almost 3 percentage points (2,98). The effect 
is subsantive (Beta= 0,142) and highly significant (sig. 0,016).   
As expected, the greater the duration of a legislative term, the higher the rate of turnover (H7). 
Holding all other predictors constant, for every additional day between two general elections, 
turnover increases by ,013 percentage points. The effect is highly significant (p<.01) and by no 
means small. An increase of the legislative term by one year increases turnover by about 4,38 
percentage points. Compared to the other predictors, legislative term duration has the biggest 
substantive effect in the model (Beta = 0,429).   
Though formulated as far back as the 1930s in the seminal work of Hyneman (1936), the MP 
wages hypothesis has not been tested extensively in internationally comparative research mostly 
because of the difficulty of acquiring data. An exception here is the work in progress by Verzichelli 
(2014). As expected we find a negative sizeable effect between MP salaries and turnover (H8). To 
be more precise, as the ratio of MP annual remuneration and Gross National Income per head 
increases by one point, legislative turnover drops by about half a percentage (-,462). Interesting as 
this observation may be the actual effect in comparison to the other predictors is very small (Beta 
= -0,079) and not statistically significant.    
Finally, as regions gain authority and regional legislative assemblies become powerful, turnover 
increases (H9). Political careers become less uni-directional and career opportunities are to be 
found in multi-level polity structures. As the regional authority index (RAI) increases by one, 
legislative turnover increases by 0,458 percentage points. The effect is substantive (Beta = 0,233), 
and highly significant (p<.01). 
When we control for country effects we find substantive and significant effects for the UK and 
Italy, but not for France. The UK is an outlier with substantially less turnover than the rest of the 
countries in our sample. Holding all other factors constant the UK decreases turnover in the sample 
by  about 14 percentage points. The actual effect (Beta = -,437) is the highest among predictors 
and highly significant (p<.01). Unlike the UK, Italy projects substantially higher turnover rates, 
increasing turnover by almost 9 percentage points when all other factors are held constant. Its 
actual effect is smaller than the UK’s (Beta= 0,293), though almost as big as the of electoral system 
disproportionality.     
Except for testing individual hypotheses we also want to know the significance of the different 
theoretically relevant groups of factors, as they are introduced in the initial full model. Table 6 
reports how much of the variability in legislative turnover is accounted for by our explanatory 
variables (R-square) as they are introduced in the regression hierarchically. More importantly, it 
reports the actual R-square change, as well as its significance, as we introduce new blocks of 
theoretically informed explanatory variables in the hierarchical regression.  
 
 
Table 5: Full model summary 
Mode
l 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change df2 Sig. F Change 
 1 Electorates ,631a ,399 ,392 7,78948 ,399 96 ,000 
2 Electoral Systems ,664b ,441 ,417 7,62862 ,043 93 ,076 
3 Political Parties ,669c ,447 ,411 7,67171 ,006 91 ,621 
4 Structures of 
opportunity 
,801d ,642 ,605 6,27791 ,195 88 ,000 
5 Country effects ,903e ,815 ,788 4,59747 ,173 85 ,000 
 
Overall, electorate party preferences, expressed here as party vote-share swings at the aggregate 
level (electoral volatility), are highly significant (p<.01) accounting for almost 40% of the total 
variance in legislative turnover (adjusted R-square of .392). The addition of electoral system 
factors (ES types, disproportionality, district magnitude) into the model results to a marginally 
significant (p<.1) increase of .043 in the adjusted R-square. Electoral systems are important, but 
not as important as we might have hypothesized in the first place. Despite the gender quota effect,  
political party factors do not improve the model neither substantively (R-square change = 0,006), 
nor significantly. However, as argued above this may be due to the difficulty of operationalizing 
and analyzing such effects at the aggregate (legislature) level of analysis. The party level of 
analysis may be more appropriate, if we want to draw results on the effects of parties on legislative 
turnover. Finally, it is the formal structure for opportunities which significantly improves our 
ability to account for the variability in legislative turnover. It increases R-square by 0,195, an 
increase which is highly significant (p<0,01). Last, country idiosyncrasies do matter as the 
introduction of the three country dummies, increases R-square by 0,173, the increase being highly 
significant at the 0,01 level.        
Conclusion 
In the present study we looked at legislative turnover from a cross-country, cross-time perspective 
focusing on eight west European democracies from 1945 to 2015. We find that the phenomenon 
has a significant dispersion across-country, but also across time. The UK projects the lowest rates 
of legislative turnover with an average rate close to the lowest ‘normal’ limit of 20%. Italy exhibits 
the highest average turnover rates, followed by France. Both the French and Italian average 
historical turnover rate stands above the highest ‘normal’ limit of 40%. The rest of the examined 
European democracies project historical average turnover rates well within the limits of 
‘normality’, 20%-40%. However, in the period since 1989 turnover explodes in all west European 
democracies under investigation. In the majority of country cases this reflects rates higher than 
40%. Used as a democratic thermometer the evolution of legislative turnover provides evidence of 
more competitive democracies, but also of more transient legislatures filled with greater numbers 
of less experienced legislators. Used as a ‘seismographer’ the evolution of legislative turnover 
shows more ‘volatile elite structures’ linked to major social and political transformations, the latter 
being of a constitutional, political party system or electoral system nature (Best, Hausmann and 
Schmitt 2000, Crowther and Matonyte 2007, Kuklis 2013). 
We find that variability in legislative turnover from election to election across country, across time 
is explained well by the combination of four factors: a) aggregate voter political party preferences, 
b) electoral systems, c) political parties, and d) the structure of opportunity. The most important 
factors appear to be voter political party choices reflected in the rates of electoral volatility. Second 
comes the political market opportunity structure, which shapes the supply of candidates and is 
 reflected mainly in the independent variables duration of legislative terms and regional authority. 
The increase of electoral volatility along with the creation of multi-level polities appears to partly 
account for the explosion of legislative turnover since 1989.  
Another such factor of importance in explaining turnover are political parties and in particular 
gender quotas, a policy instrument that saw a dramatic rise in use by parties in the 1990s and the 
2000s. However, political party related factors come up as the least important of all four elements 
in the representative elite production process. Given the gatekeeping functions of selectorates and 
that much turnover happens prior to general elections this seems as a bit of a paradox. One 
explanation for this may be that political party effects on turnover are neutralized at the aggregate 
level. Arguably such effects are better analyzed at the party level (Francois and Grossman 2015).  
Finally, electoral system type, disproportionality and district magnitude, appear to substantively 
and significantly affect turnover. However, the electoral system factor comes up as a less important 
in the representative elite production process in comparison to electorates and opportunity 
structures. A potential explanation here is that electoral systems may structure selectorate or even 
candidate decisions, but they do not affect them in any crucial way. As Shomer (2014, p. 543) 
observed, electoral systems in general and ballot type in particular do not determine the manner 
by which parties select candidates. As such, the primary role of electoral systems in relation to 
turnover arguably comes at the end of the representative elite production process, when they 
translate votes into seats. By the time this happens though, turnover has already occurred once at 
the general election and once at the selection stage. Thus, their effect is significant, but smaller 
than expected. In view of this, the use of electoral systems as proxies for selectoral practices needs 
to be reconsidered. Selectoral practices and their effect on legislative turnover merit attention on 
their own right. This could happen by taking the level of analysis down to the party level. Hazan 
and Rahat’s (2006) hypotheses here still beg to be tested.   
Overall, we are confident that the results of this study are significant and that the present paper is 
a first good attempt at explaining turnover in the selected sample of West European democracies 
during the last 70 years. However, the study is work in progress. Despite the fact that the regression 
assumptions of the full model are met, we need to be cautious before generalizing to the rest of the 
population under investigation. First, there is more work to be done in relation to operationalizing 
certain variables, data processing and filling of empty cells. Second, the sample size when we 
control for country effects is acceptable for hypothesis testing and strength of effect, but becomes 
marginally acceptable in relation to full model fit and controlling for random effectsxviii. In view 
of the above it may be advisable to incorporate more country cases in the sample or reduce the 
model to its most significant results. Third, if we do decide to increase the higher level groups 
(countries) to 10 and as the structure of the data is cross-sectional, cross-time (TSCT) it may be 
advisable to opt for a Multi-Level Analysis with Bayesian inference. Such analytical challenges 
will be addressed during the next stage of this work in progress. In the meantime, we hope to have 
contributed in making internationally comparative research on turnover a bit more systematic and 
less sporadic.   
NOTES 
i The paper is the product of a research project funded by the Research Organization Flanders – FWO. 
ii Data collection was completed in mid-June 2016. A missing data mission is to follow during July 2016. The paper in hand is 
based on a first analysis of the available data. The analysis was conducted between June 15 and 1st of July 2016.   
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
iii A first-entry or returning MP who was seated after general elections, but whose election was later invalidated is not counted as 
a newcomer. On the contrary a first-entry or returning MP who for some reason was elected, but took up the seat later than the 
first day of parliament counts as a newcomer. Finally, MPs who entered legislative politics as replacements, whether by 
substitution or by-elections, and managed to get elected in the next general election also count as newcomers. 
 
iv The archival material was accessed in a series of research visits in the legislative assemblies of the eight legislative assemblies 
under investigation. Some databases are publicly available, while others were accessed upon request.  
In the case of the Austrian Nationalrat we used the Liste der Abgeordneten zum Österreichischen Nationalrat. The list is publicly 
available on the website of the Nationalrat. An improved version, which we used for the purpose of this research, was provided by 
the Head of the Department of Scientific Support and Coordination in Parliamentary Matters of the Austrian Parliament during a 
research visit in the Austrian parliament in February 2015.  
In the case of the Belgian De Kamer/La Chambre, data on newcomers was collected from the digitalised Belgian parliamentary 
composition documents titled “Lijst van de Kamerleden en hun Opvolgers – Liste des Representants et de leurs suppleants” for the 
period 1949-2014.  
In the case of the Dutch Tweede Kamer we used the online “Parlement en Politiek” database, developed by the Montesquieu 
Institute in the Hague. The front-office data were double checked with the Institute’s back office data on political mandates.  
In the case of the French Assemblée Nationale we used the recently upgraded Base de données historiques : Les députés français 
depuis 1789. The new database has been online since 14 April 2016.   
In the case of the Italian Camera dei Deputati we used the online dataset on political mandates of Members of the Italian Parliament. 
The data was double checked through the Manuale Parlamentare Camera Dei Deputati, Senato della Repubblica and La Novicela. 
The Manuale was accessed during a research stay in CIRCAP, Siena in October 2015. The Novicela was accessed in the same 
period in the Italian parliament library in Rome.    
Paradoxically, in the case of the Swedish Riksdag we used only archival material. The reason for this is that digitalized data on the 
political mandates of members of parliament are only available for the period since 1991. Two publicly available archival sources 
were used. First and foremost we relied on the Riksdagsmatrikel (Annual Registry of the Swedish Parliament) since 1944. Second, 
we cross examined the Matrikel data with the biographical registry of Swedish MPs, in particular the Tvakammar-Riksdagen 1867-
1970, Ledamoter Och Valkretsar, vol. I to V. And the two volume 1971-1994 version.   
In the case of the Swiss Nationalrat we used the list of Members of Parliament of the Nationalrat Banque de données recensant 
les membres des conseils depuis 1848, which is publicly available online.   
In the case of the UK House of Commons we used the ‘Members of Parliament 1832-2005 database’, created under the direction 
of Professor Michael Rush (2015), Exeter University, and now curated by The History of Parliament Trust, in the UK. The database 
is offline, accessible upon request. Data since 2006 were collected from the UK House of Commons Library publication Members 
of Parliament 1979-2010 accessed during a research stay in London in November 2015. The 2015 data are online.   
v The first dataset we consulted is Datacube, which, among others, also contains data on first entry MPs for 11 west European 
countries for the period 1848-1998 (Best and Cotta 2000). Moreover, we also used the datasets developed by: Stefan Fiers’ (1998) 
on Belgian parliament newcomers (first-entry and returning), Marcello Jenny (2014) on Austrian incumbents exiting the 
Nationalrat, Ysmal (1994) on both incumbents and newcomers, Francois and Grossmann (2014) on French National Assembly 
newcomers (first entry and returning) and finally the CIRCaP-COPEI Archives at the University of Siena" (Circap Observatory on 
Political Elites and Institutions).  
vi Our data on the share of preferential voting on turnover corroborates this. Preferential votes that led to a newcomer being voted 
into office by disrupting the party list rank in the period from 1945-2015 is 0,2% of total legislative turnover in Austria, 0,53% in 
the Netherlands, and 2,6% in Belgium. Thus in respect to electorates the main hypothesis to be tested is in relation to aggregate 
voter party preferences. 
 
vii There are various aggregate volatility measures, the most important of which appear to be the following:  a) total aggregate 
volatility (V) or the Pedersen index (Pedersen 1980) and two alternative measures suggested by Koppel and Diskin (2009, p. 282 
– 284), b) the lsq-index and c) the 1 –cosines index. In this paper we opt for total aggregate volatility (V). There are two main 
reasons for this. First, after an assessment of the various volatility indexes in 31 European countries after WWII to 2012, Ersson 
(2012, p.10) concluded that “all three measures go together quite closely”. Second, it is not meaningful to replace v with any 
other general measure, also because most studies employ the v measure when measuring total aggregate volatility” (Ersson 2012, 
p. 10). However, the Pedersen index (V) has been calculated differently by different scholars. Differences relate on the different 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
rules applied in particular to measure continuous parties, alliances, mergers, splits, genuinely new parties and death of parties 
(Ersson 2012, p.4-6). In this study we will be using Ersson’s (2012) total aggregate volatility dataset. The reason for this is 
pragmatic. We were granted full access to the dataset, along with all indexes, which covers the whole period immediately after 
WWII and up to 2012. For elections after 2012 we calculate V using Ersson’ (2012) formula and rules.      
 
viii Taagepera and Grofman (2003, p. 673, 661) refer to it as a “zoo of indices proposed and used by various researchers”. Indeed 
we count as much as nineteen proposed indexes. They can be grouped in three main categories: a) Largest Remainders methods 
like Rae’s index, L-H, LSq, L-H adj., S-L), b) Highest Averages methods (Lijphart’s index and D’ Hont index), c) Regression 
index (Kalogirou 1999 p. 62). The most widely used indices, Gallagher’s Gh and Loosemore–Hanby’s D, satisfy more criteria 
than any other index (Taagepera and Grofman 2003, p. 673). Contrary to the L-H D and the adjusted L-H index, which measure 
the amount of disproportionality per party, the Gallagher Least Squares index has the benefit of measuring disproportionality per 
election, which more suitable to our research design.  
 
ix In what has been one of the first empirical tests of Hyneman’s (1938) salary effect hypothesis, Oxendale’s (1979) study on 
compensation and voluntary turnover in US state legislative lower chambers does not support an assertion that higher compensation 
will result in lowered turnover rates. He finds that the relationship among compensation and state level turnover differs significantly 
from state to state. Greene (1993) argues that Oxendale’s (1979) attempt to measure the salary factor is crude and that it offers no 
convincing evidence for the relationship between compensation and turnover. However, he too, in his study of economic 
determinants of US interstate legislative turnover, finds that the salary variable approaches only marginal negative significance 
(Greene 1993, p. 94). Blair and Henry (1981) argue, based on their research in Arkansas, that family considerations are more 
important than financial considerations, but that the latter are still significant. 
David Ray (1974) provides evidence according to which salaries, among other factors, influence incumbents’ willingness to seek 
re-election. Similarly, Rosenthal (1974) too finds a significant effect of compensation on turnover. Squire (1988), in his seminal 
work on professionalization and legislative turnover provides more solid evidence in support of the thesis that higher pay is 
significantly and positively associated with longer career terms. Sobel (1998), too, in his study on the effects of tax increases and 
cost reductions on US states’ legislative turnover, finds a consistently significant effect of legislators salaries. As the level of salary 
increases the percentage of seats up for election not captured by incumbents drops. Finally, Keane and Merlo (2007) analyse how 
US legislators respond to monetary incentives. They find that a 20 per cent reduction in the congressional wage leads to a 20 per 
cent reduction in the average duration of congressional careers.   
 
x Simple solutions focus on measuring the presence or not of regional legislative assemblies, or alternatively emphasize the 
availability and number of seats in assemblies beyond the national level one. More complicated ones focus on regional legislative 
assembly strength. They take into consideration their power vis a vis the executive like the Index of Executive Dominance 
developed by Kaiss (2010), and the presence or not of institutional barriers impeding level-hopping  (Blondel, 1973; Brace & 
Ward, 1998). 
 
xi On theoretical and statistical grounds we omitted 9 cases: the 1995 Belgian election after the new constitutional arrangements 
and decrease in assembly size to 150, the 1946 November French general election which took place only 169 days after the 1946 
June constitutional assembly election, the 1958 French election, a landslide taking place after the new constitutional 
arrangements establishing the fifth republic, the Italian 1994 election a landslide following electoral and party system changes at 
the beginning of the second republic, the Italian 2013 landslide election of historically high turnover (65%) and electoral 
volatility, the 1955 Dutch election for the newly increased assembly from 100 to 150 seats, the 1970 Swedish election, the first 
one after the introduction of a new unicameral assembly, the UK 1974 snap election only 224 days after the previous one in that 
same year, the 1997 UK landslide election for the unusually high turnover and electoral volatility rates 
 
xii However, the smaller bias usually associated with MLA Bayesian estimators could be a road worth investigating at a later 
stage, on the condition that the sample is increased with another two country cases. 
xiii Turnover after the October 2015 Swiss general election to be calculated and added to the sample 
 
xiv Data for France 1946 – 1958 to be quality controlled due to a change in the NA database in April 2016 
 
xv Legislative turnover after the 1994, 2008 and 2013 Italian general election to be quality controlled 
 
xvi With the addition of the case of the 2015 Swiss legislative turnover total N = 151 
 
xvii Various ways of recoding the variable are possible. One alternative would be to code majority, plurality, open list and 
panachage ballot types as 0 and all remaining systems as 1. A second alternative would be to recode electoral systems as proxies 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
of measuring incentives to cultivate personal vote (Verzichelli 2014). In this case the hypothesis would be that ‘electoral systems, 
where the vote is more closely connected to individual candidates, decrease turnover’.  Electoral systems in which the vote is 
connected to an individual, like majority, plurality and preference vote ones can be coded as 1, while all others as 0. Another 
solution would be to use the index of ‘particularism’ or personal vote index developed by Wallack Gaviria, Panizzia and Stein 
(Wallack et al 2003) on the basis of the Carey and Shugart rank ordering of electoral formulas (1995). Unfortunately, the index 
has only been calculated since 1978. 
 
xviii The sample consists of 141 observations and 9 individual predictors (k). In view of this, using Green’s (1991) criterion 
(minimum sample = 104 + k) the minimum acceptable sample size for hypothesis testing of our 9 predictors using regression is 
113 (<141). This allows us to test more predictors if we so decide in a full initial model (country dummies). The sample size is 
also acceptable for testing overall model fit. Using Green’s (1991) criterion (minimum sample = 50 + 8*k) the minimum 
acceptable sample size for testing the overall fit of a regression model is 122 (<141). However, the inclusion of three more 
predictors (country dummies) in the model automatically results in reaching above the  acceptable sample size. However, in the 
future, as the final model to be tested would be the reduced one, we need not worry about this at this stage. Finally, the sample 
size is acceptable given that we seek a big effect thanks to the holistic theoretical approach in explaining legislative turnover. The 
criterion here for a .8 effect is a minimum acceptable sample of 80 with up to 20 predictors (Miles and Shevlin 2001). Finally, 
using Cohen’s (1988) criterion (K/(N-1)) for random data effects, our sample of 141 observations with 9 predictors (k) gives an R 
of .006 for random data, which is a very small effect. We need to be careful though as an increase by only three predictors (ie 
country dummies) automatically increases random data effects at .08.  
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